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This paper considers a model of Internet-style trade, where a
seller cannot deal directly with buyers, and the trade must be
mediated. A mediator sets the rules of a trade procedure (an
auction mechanism) and can collect fees from the traders. Our main
question is:
What auction mechanisms maximize the mediator's revenue?
This question has not only theoretic interest, but also practical
relevance, as we attempt to capture, in a stylized way, an interaction
between sellers and buyers on Internet auctions where the role of
mediators is played by such giant commercial institutions as eBay, the
dominant auction site inmany countrieswith reported revenue steadily
growing (despite the recent financial crisis) and reaching $8.7 billion in
2009,1 and its former major competitors, Amazon and Yahoo.2
Consider a setting with a seller who has a single object for sale, a
large population of buyers, and a mediator. The seller and buyers haveindependent private values for the object. In the initial period the
mediator announces auction rules. That is, she chooses an auction
mechanism through which she collects a part of the trade surplus.3
The seller observes the mechanism and decides whether to consume
the object or to put it for sale. If the object is consumed, the game
ends. If the object is put for sale in period t≥1, a set of n buyers is
drawn at random from the buyers' population and the auction takes
place (in every period a new sample of buyers is drawn).
We characterize optimal mechanisms for amediator. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that an optimal mechanism admits a simple and
practical implementation as a repeated Vickrey auction where the
seller pays to the mediator a closing fee, that is, a fixed percentage of
the final price. This is in contrast to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
who analyze a single-period bilateral trade mediated by a “broker”.
Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) optimal mechanism is a
nontrivial function of the seller's report about his private type and
hence it lacks a simple implementation.
We search for an optimal mechanism on the class of stationary
ones (fixed over time). This assumption is motivated by practical
concerns of equal treatment or non-discrimination, that is to say, the
same auction rules must apply for all participants, irrespective of their
identity or period of participation. The real life supports thisechanism we understand a one-period game with incomplete
by the mediator and played by the traders in which a desirable
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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additional reason for focusing on stationary mechanisms is that
optimality in suchmechanisms can be obtained endogenously under a
simple assumption of anonymity of sellers. This assumption requires
that a seller can freely leave and re-enter an auction site under a
different identity (as a newcomer). We argue that it allows finding an
optimal mechanism among stationary ones. Notice that anonymity
immediately entails that the seller's expected continuation payoff from
future auctions must be non-decreasing over time. Otherwise the seller
could be better off by withdrawing the object and starting a new
auction instead (pretending to be a different seller, which is possible
by the anonymity assumption). On the other hand, a continuation
payoff for a seller which is increasing over time cannot be optimal
either. The seller's continuation payoff is important only for the
seller's participation decision. So, since a seller has agreed to
participate for some continuation payoff, he would definitely
participate for the same payoff in any future period, hence it cannot
be optimal to pay him more. It follows that in an optimal mechanism
the seller's continuation payoff is constant over time, and, conse-
quently, it is sufficient to concentrate on stationary mechanisms only.
There are two other important assumptions in our model. First,
whenever the seller fails to sell the object, he is allowed to offer it for
(re-)auction again, as many times as he wants. This assumption is
realistic for Internet auctions. Indeed, a seller has a re-auction option
in real life and this option has essential impact on players' strategic
behavior, as noted, for example, by Fudenberg et al. (1985), Milgrom
(1987), McAfee and Vincent (1997), Horstmann and LaCasse (1997),
Gupta and Lebrun (1999). Our second assumption is that in every
trade the seller faces a different set of buyers drawn from a large
population. This is reasonable in the context of Internet auctions
where a typical auction runs several days and most of the bids are
received in the very last day. Our model can be considered as an
instance in many similar sales on Internet where a buyer's objective is
to purchase an object of a certain kind, not to purchase an object from
a specific seller. A buyer who fails to buy an object from a seller can
obtain it elsewhere and therefore has no reason to return to this
particular seller. In contrast, the existing literature on auctions with
resale assumes that there is the same set of bidders in all auctions.4
This implies two differences from our model. In models with a
possibility of one-time after-auction resale, each bidder places a
positive probability on buying in a secondary market if she loses the
auction (Gupta and Lebrun, 1999; Haile 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003;
Zheng 2002; Krishna, 2002, Section 4.4; Calzolari and Pavan 2006;
Garratt and Tröger, 2006; Pagnozzi 2007). In models with re-
auctioning, the optimal reserve price declines due to Bayesian
updating of the distribution of bidders' private values after every
auction (Fudenberg et al., 1985; McAfee and Vincent 1997).
In our model a winning bidder is not allowed to re-auction the
object. This is a simplifying assumption which can be relaxed without
any effect on the results since a new set of bidders arrives in each
period, there is no issue of signaling and information communication
for the bidders between periods (in contrast to Haile 1999, 2000,
2001, 2003; Zheng 2002; and others). If a winning bidder becomes a
seller, she would face ex-ante the same environment in the next-
period auction. The expected revenue from a new auction is not
higher than her current use value, thus she prefers to consume the
object. This contrasts our results, in particular, to Zheng (2002) who
assumes that a fixed, finite set of bidders is involved in trade, where,
despite that bidders are ex-ante symmetric, the initial seller and the
winning bidder face different trade environments, and the winner
may benefit from a re-auction.4 The exceptions are Haile (1999, 2001) who allows new bidders (in particular, all
new bidders) to participate in a re-auction; and Bikhchandani and Huang (1989), Bose
and Deltas (1999, 2007) and Calzolari and Pavan (2006) who model resale to a given
secondary market where the original bidders need not participate.Our paper is related to Jullien and Mariotti (2006) who study an
interaction between a seller and a few buyers in a similar setting, but
with a common value component in traders' utilities for the object.
Jullien and Mariotti (2006) focus on efficiency issues and find that
trademediated by an uninformed “broker”may bemore efficient than
unmediated trade.
Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2008) consider a problem similar to
the current paper, but they focus on a very restricted set of auction
mechanisms, Vickrey auctions where themediator chooses two fees, a
listing fee, a fixed amount paid by a seller regardless of the auction
outcome, and a closing fee, a percentage of the closing price if the
object is sold. This paper generalizesMatros and Zapechelnyuk (2008)
to a general class of auction mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in
Section 2. We analyze the seller's optimal participation decision
in Section 3 and characterize mediator–optimal mechanisms in
Section 4. Section 5 describes a simple implementation of an optimal
mechanism. Section6 concludes. TheAppendix containsomitted proofs.2. The model
Let player 0 be a seller and letN be a large (infinite) population of
bidders. The seller has one object for sale. Let v0 be a private use value
of the seller and vi be a private use value of bidder i∈N . Assume that
all use values are independent, furthermore, bidders' use values are
identically distributed on interval Xv ;v
 
according to distribution
function F, and the seller's use value is distributed on the same
interval according to distribution function H. We also assume
that functions F and H are differentiable and have positive density
on Xv ;v
 
, and, in addition, satisfy themonotonic hazard rate conditions
(e.g., Myerson 1981), that is, z−1−F zð Þ
f zð Þ and z +
H zð Þ
h zð Þ are strictly
increasing on Xv ;v
 
, where f and h denote the corresponding density
functions. Distribution functions F and H are common knowledge, and
all players are risk neutral.
The timing of the game is as follows. In period t=0, the mediator
announces an auction mechanism that will be used in all further
interactions. In period t=1,2,…, the seller either consumes the object
(and the game ends) or puts it for sale via the specified auction
mechanism. Then a random sample of n bidders5 is selected from
populationN , the object is allocated and the payments are transferred
according to the mechanism. If the object is allocated to one of the
bidders, the game ends. Otherwise, if the object is returned to the
seller, the game proceeds to the next period.
Without loss of generality, we consider the class of direct
mechanisms (e.g., Myerson, 1981). In a direct mechanism the seller
and each bidder simultaneously and confidentially report their use
values to the mediator, and the mediator then determines who gets
the object and how much each trader must pay (or receive) as some
functions of the vector of reported use values. Formally, a direct
mechanism is a pair p;xð Þ where6 p : Xv ;v
 n + 1→Δn + 1 describes
probabilities of various outcomes and x : Xv ;v
 n + 1→ℝn + 1 describes
payments of the traders as functions of their reported use values.







pi wtð Þ is the probability that bidder i gets the object, i=1,…,n,
p0 wtð Þ = 1−∑ni = 1 pi wtð Þ is the probability that the seller retains the
object; xi wtð Þ is a payment of bidder i=1,…,n to the mediator, and
x0 wtð Þ is a payment of the mediator to the seller. Note that for every5 The results can be generalized to the case where the number of bidders, n, is
random, drawn from the same distribution in each period. Indeed, all what matters
here is that a seller makes the decision of auctioning his object before n is drawn, thus
his decision depends on the distribution of the number of bidders (which is constant
across periods), but not on its realizations.
6 Δn+1 denotes the unit simplex in (n+1) -dimensional space.
7 U p;xð Þ0 may depend on v0 if there is a small probability that the seller is not able to
re-auction the object and thus required to consume it. See Section 5 for a discussion.
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the object.
In every period, due to our assumption that a new set of n random
bidders is drawn, the seller faces ex-ante the same problem:
auctioning an object via a fixed mechanism to a set of n bidders
with private use values independently drawn from interval Xv ;v
 
with
distribution function F. It follows that a decision of the seller that is
optimal at period t should be also optimal at every other period,
before or after t. Thus we focus only on players' Markov strategies that
depend on traders' private use values and do not depend on the
information available from previous transactions. In addition, we
assume that bidders are anonymous, that is, a mechanism cannot
depend on bidders' identities, and we focus on symmetric strategies
for the bidders.





is her reported value as a function of her actual use value. A Markov
strategy of the seller is a pair (α,ω0), where α : Xv ;v
 
→ 0;1½  specifies
the probability, α(v0), that the seller decides to auction the object, and




specifies his reported value, ω0(v0), as functions of
his use value v0. We refer to component α as the participation strategy
of the seller. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game when every
player uses a Markov strategy is called a Markov perfect equilibrium
and described by a triple (α,ω0,ω).
The following lemma is a standard result (e.g., Krishna, 2002) that
shows that without loss of generality we can restrict attention to
direct truthful mechanisms, that is, the mechanisms where reporting
true use values is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 1. (Revelation Principle) Given a mechanism p;xð Þ and a
Markov perfect equilibrium (α,ω0,ω) of the correspondent game, there
exists a direct truthful mechanism p′;x′
 
which has a payoff-equivalent
Markov perfect equilibrium (α,ω0′,ω′) such that ω0′(v0)=v0 and ω′
(vi)=vi, i=1,…,n.
Proof. For every v0; v1;…; vnð Þ∈ Xv ;v
 n + 1 define p′ v0; v1;…; vnð Þ =
p ω0 v0ð Þ;ω v1ð Þ;…;ω vnð Þð Þ
and x′ v0; v1;…; vnð Þ = x ω0 v0ð Þ;ω v1ð Þ;…;ω vnð Þð Þ.□
Note that for non-Markov perfect equilibria the revelation principle
need not hold, since an equilibrium strategy for the seller may stipulate
reporting different values in different periods, which in general cannot
be mapped into a strategy of reporting truth in all periods.
Let us introduce somemore notations. LetV = Xv ;v
 n + 1 be the set
of type profiles of the seller and bidders 1,…,n, and letV−i = Xv ;v
 n be
the set of type profiles of all players except i, i=0,1,…,n. Denote by
v and v−i generic elements of V and V−i, and denote by f and f−i the
joint densities of types in V and V−i, respectively. Next, for every
i=0,1,…,n denote by Ppi við Þ the probability of i to obtain (retain for
i=0) the object, conditional on i's use value vi,
Ppi við Þ = ∫
V−i
pi vi;v−ið Þf−i v−ið Þdv−i:
Also, denote by xi við Þ the expected payment of bidder i to the
mediator (from the mediator to the seller for i=0) conditional on vi,
Pxi við Þ = ∫
V−i
xi vi;v−ið Þf−i v−ið Þdv−i:
Then, the expected utility of bidder i=1,…,n is defined by the
following:
Ui við Þ = viPpi við Þ−Pxi við Þ: ð1Þ
The expected seller's utility is defined by the following:
U0 v0ð Þ = 1−α v0ð Þð Þv0 + α v0ð Þ Px0 v0ð Þ + Pp0 v0ð ÞδU0 v0ð Þð Þ; ð2Þwhere δ is a discount factor, 0bδb1. Thus, with probability 1−α(v0)
the seller consumes the object and obtains its use value v0, and with
probability α(v0) he auctions the object and obtains the expected
transfer x0 v0ð Þ from the mediator and, if the object is not sold, the
discounted next-period expected utility.
A direct truthful mechanism p;xð Þ is feasible if it satisfies the
following constraints:
(a) Individual rationality. For every trader i=0,1,…,n and every
vi∈ Xv ;v
 
Ui við Þ≥0: ð3Þ
(b) Incentive compatibility: Reporting true use values is a Nash
equilibrium. For every trader i=0,1,…,n and all vi;wi∈ Xv ;v
 
Ui við Þ≥Ui wi jvið Þ; ð4Þ
where Ui(wi|vi) is the expected utility of trader i=0,1,…,n if she
reports wi when her true use value is vi. More specifically, for each
i=1,…,n
Ui wi jvið Þ = viPpi wið Þ−Pxi wið Þ ð5Þ
and
U0 w0 jv0ð Þ = 1−α v0ð Þð Þv0 + α v0ð Þ Px0 w0ð Þ + Pp0 w0ð ÞδU0 v0ð Þð Þ:
Note that the seller's next-period expected revenue U0(v0) does not
depend on the current report w0.
3. Seller's participation strategy
Let us now describe the optimal participation strategy for the
seller, α. The seller decides to participate, i.e., to auction the object, if
and only if his expected payoff from auctioning the object exceeds his
use value v0. Note that, since a new set of bidders arrives in each
period, the seller faces ex-ante the same problem in every period.
Stationarity of the environment implies that if the seller decides to
auction the object in the first period, he should re-auction it forever,
until it is sold.
Denote by U p;xð Þ0 the maximum expected revenue of the seller if he
auctions the object in all periods (i.e., for α(v0)=1),
U p;xð Þ0 = max
w0∈ Xv ;v½ 
x0 w0ð Þ + p0 w0ð ÞδU p;xð Þ0
h i
: ð6Þ
Observe that U p;xð Þ0 does not depend on v0, since the object is never
consumed.7In equilibrium, the seller will auction the object whenever
his maximum gain from participation is greater than his use value.
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy α must satisfy for every v0∈ Xv ;v
 
α v0ð Þ =
1; if U p;xð Þ0 ≥v0;
0; if U p;xð Þ0 bv0:
8<
:
The case U p;xð Þ0 = v0 is a zero probability event, thus without any
effect on the results we can assume α(v0)=1 for that case.
Note that by the incentive compatibility constraint (4), the seller's
payoff is maximized when he reports his true use value,w0=v0. Thus
we can rewrite (6) as follows,
U p;xð Þ0 =
Px0 v0ð Þ + Pp0 v0ð ÞδU p;xð Þ0 : ð7Þ
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hand side of (7) does not depend on v0 either (though v0 in x0 v0ð Þ and
p0 v0ð Þ will be retained for consistency of notations).
4. Mediator–optimal mechanisms
We now find an auction mechanism that is optimal for the
mediator on the set of all feasible direct truthful mechanisms, denoted
by M.
Given a direct truthful mechanism p;xð Þ and a seller's participa-




α v0ð Þ ∑
n
i=1
xi vð Þ−x0 vð Þ + p0 vð ÞδUM
 
f vð Þdv: ð8Þ
For a given realization of traders' use values, v, the mediator's
revenue from the auction is given by the expression in parentheses
and equal to the sum of payments from the bidders net of the
payment to the seller, plus the expected next-period gain if the
object is not sold. Note that this revenue is collected on only under
the condition that the seller is willing to participate, α(v0)=1, i.e.,
his own expected revenue is greater than v0. Consequently, the key
to the optimization problem for the mediator lies in balancing two
opposite forces: the net revenue of the mediator conditional on the
seller's participation and the likelihood that the seller decides to
participate.
Before we turn to balancing these two forces, it will be con-
venient first to solve an auxiliary problem. Fix the seller's expected
revenue U0 from auctioning the object and find a mediator–optimal
mechanism among those that yield expected revenue U0 to any
seller. This is equivalent to a mechanism where the mediator
acquires the object from the seller for price U0 and then auctions
it off.
Formally, for every U0⁎ letM(U0⁎) be the set of mechanisms where
every seller's expected revenue is exactly U0⁎,
M U⁎0
 	
= p;xð Þ∈M : U p;xð Þ0 = U⁎0
n o
:
We now find the mediator–optimal mechanism on M(U0⁎)
whenever this set is nonempty.
Let p;xð Þ∈M U⁎0
 	
. Fix the seller's use value v0, and suppose that
v0≤U0⁎, that is, the seller always auctions the object. Conditional on
this event, the expected revenue of the mediator is given by





xi vð Þf−0 v−0ð Þdv−0−Px0 v0ð Þ + Pp0 v0ð ÞδUM v0ð Þ; ð9Þ
and the total revenue of the seller and the mediator is given by





xi vð Þf−0 v−0ð Þdv−0 + Pp0 v0ð ÞδZ v0ð Þ
≡UM v0ð Þ + U⁎0:
ð10Þ
Denote by C(vi) the virtual value of bidder i, i=1,…,n,




The difference vi−C(vi) is referred in the literature as the
information rent of bidder i (see the discussion in Krishna 2002,
Section 5.2.3).
The next lemma states that an optimal mechanism is achieved by
allocating the object to the bidder with the highest virtual value
whenever it is greater than the total expected continuation revenue ofthe mediator and the seller, and otherwise returning the object to the
seller.
Lemma 2. A mechanism p;xð Þ is mediator–optimal on M(U0⁎) if the
following holds.
(i) The total revenue of the seller and the mediator, Z(v0), conditional
on v0≤U0⁎ is independent of v0 and equal to Z⁎, where Z⁎ is a












(ii) the allocation rule p satisfies










(iii) the transfer rule x satisfies
Px0 v0ð Þ = U⁎0 1−δPp0 v0ð Þð Þ; and




Ppi zð Þf zð Þdz; i = 1;…;n:
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. Conditions (ii) and (iii) say
that a mechanism p;xð Þ that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2 is the
Myerson's (1981) optimal mechanism, with the seller's “outside
option” equal to δZ⁎ and with an additional element, the transfer
between the seller and the mediator, x0. Condition (i) says that the
joint revenue of the seller and the mediator, Z⁎, is determined as the
unique solution of a dynamic maximization problem. Note that,
though we find optimal mechanisms on a setM(U0⁎) that depends on
the expected revenue U0 of the seller, the only part of the mechanism
that is a function of U0⁎ is x0. The total expected revenue Z⁎ of the
mediator and the seller, as well as the allocation rule p and the
transfers from the bidders x−0 are independent of U0⁎.
It remains to determine theoptimalvalueofU0⁎ and then to choose x0
that satisfies (iii) in Lemma 2. Observe that for every U0⁎ the expected








Here, Z⁎−U0⁎ is the mediator's revenue conditional on the seller's
participation (otherwise it is equal to zero) and H(U0⁎) is the
probability that the seller participates, H(U0⁎)=Pr[v0≤U0⁎].
Consider a mechanism p;xð Þ that achieves the total expected
revenue of Z⁎ for the seller and the mediator. While keeping p and
x−0 the same, the seller's expected revenue U0 can take any value in
[0,Z⁎]. To see this, let x0 vð Þ = λ∑ni = 1 xi vð Þ, v∈V and λ∈ [0,1]. Then
the expected revenue of the seller is equal to λZ⁎∈ [0,Z⁎].
Hence, the mediator–optimal mechanism on the set of all feasible
mechanismsmust satisfy conditions of Lemma 2 and select the seller's









That is, the optimal choice of the seller's expected revenue U0⁎
conditional on the event that the auction occurs will balance two
opposite forces: a higher seller's (conditional) revenue leads on the
one hand to a lower revenue for the mediator if the auction occurs,
Z⁎−U0⁎, but on the other hand to a greater probability,H(U0⁎), that the
seller will auction the object.
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Now we will demonstrate that a mediator–optimal mechanism is
implementable by a closing-fee auction. In every period, the mediator
runs a Vickrey auction with a reserve price. The seller submits a
reserve price, r, and every bidder submits a bid. The winning bidder (if
any) pays the closing price equal to greater of the second highest bid
and the reserve price. If the object is sold, the mediator collects a
closing fee, a fixed percentage μ∈ [0,1] from the closing price. Namely,
if there is a winning bidder and the closing price is equal to ρ, then the
mediator leaves μρ for herself and passes (1−μ)ρ to the seller.
Let μ⁎=1−U0⁎ /Z⁎, where Z⁎ is given by Lemma 2 and U0 is the
solution of the optimization problem (13).
Theorem 1. The closing-fee auction with closing fee μ is
mediator–optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix.□
The intuition behind this result is as follows.8 In our model, the
seller's optimal strategy stipulates to always re-auction the object if it
is not sold. Therefore, the relevant valuation of the object is the
expected value derived from future resales, and not the use value
derived from its consumption. Thus, in contrast to Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), our mediator–optimal mechanism need not
make use of the seller's private information.
Note that a Vickrey auction with reserve price is not a direct
mechanism per se. A seller chooses the reserve price that maximizes
his own expected revenue, which need not be equal to the one that is
optimal for the mediator. The problem that we tackle here is a design
of a fee scheme that provides the seller an incentive to choose the
reserve price which is optimal for the mediator. It turns out that the
closing-fee auction does the job for an appropriate choice of a closing
fee. In this auction the seller and the mediator receive fixed
percentages of expected revenues that do not vary with time, so the
seller's incentives are perfectly aligned with the mediator's, and,
consequently, the seller chooses the mediator–optimal reserve price.
The assumption of anonymity of traders is a cornerstone of our
results, since it allows us to search for an optimal mechanism among
stationary ones (i.e., those which do not depend on time or identity of
the traders). If this assumption is relaxed, more general mechanisms
must be considered. We do not know whether the closing-fee auction
remains optimal in this setting. In fact, we suspect that the mediator
might find a better mechanism among non-stationary ones. The reason
is that in a non-stationarymechanism, the seller's strategy of always re-
auctioning the object until it is sold need not be optimal anymore, so his
use value may be relevant for the mechanism design problem.
Therefore, the mediator has a potential to discriminate sellers and,
possibly, to raise a higher revenue than from a stationary, non-
discriminatory mechanism. The fact that eBay, the dominant player on
the auction market, uses identity-dependent mechanisms by offering
discounts to sellers for re-auctioning objects under specific circum-
stances9 makes this question especially appealing for future research.
Another interesting question is whether our closing-fee auction
remains optimal (or close to optimal) if there is a small probability, ε,
that after the auction has failed, the seller consumes the object
without re-auctioning it. In this case the seller's expected continua-
tion payoff, U0⁎(v0,ε), depends on the seller's use value v0: after an
appropriate adjustment of (7), U0⁎(v0,ε) is defined as follows,
U⁎0 v0; εð Þ = Px0 v0ð Þ + Pp0 v0ð Þδ 1−εð ÞU⁎0 v0; εð Þ + εv0
 	
:8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful insights on this issue.
9 See http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/relist.html. We thank an anonymous referee
for pointing out this fact.An optimal mechanism may thus be a function of v0 which
discriminates sellers whose use values are in the neighborhood of the
seller's continuation payoff of the original problem, U0⁎. However,
observe that U0⁎(v0,ε) is continuous in ε and approaches U0⁎ as ε→0,
so the closing-fee auction approaches an optimal one.
6. Conclusion
Our paper describes Internet-style auctions and characterizes
optimal mechanisms for a mediator. In stark contrast to Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), our mediator–optimal mechanism does not
make use of the seller's private information and for thisreason admits
a simple implementation via the closing-fee auction.
Obviously, there is a number of restrictions that make our results
appropriate (such as existence of a large population of potential
bidders) and some possibly relevant features of internet auctions are
ignored in our model, for example, bidders' costs of search through
ads on an auction site, and possible fees charged for increasing
visibility of ads (printing in bold font, moving up the list, etc.)
connected to that problem. Nevertheless, we believe that our results
are relevant in many situations, and this paper presents a good
starting point for further research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
The following lemma is due to Myerson (1981).
Lemma 3. Let p;xð Þ be a feasible mechanism. Then for every i=1,…,n








xi vð Þf−0 v−0ð Þdv−0 = ∫
V−0
C við Þpi vð Þf vð Þdv−Ui 0ð Þ: ð15Þ
We now prove Lemma 2. Suppose that v0≤U0⁎. Since UM(v0)=Z
(v0)−U0⁎ and U0⁎ is fixed, the mediator who wishes to maximize UM
(v0) also maximizes Z(v0). By (10) and Lemma 3 we have
Z v0ð Þ=∫
V−0
p0 vð ÞδZ v0ð Þ+ ∑
n
i=1






The individual rationality constraint requires Ui(0)≥0, and in the
optimal mechanism it is binding, hence Ui(0)=0, i=1,…,n. We now
find p that yields the maximum value of Z(v0). Clearly, for every v, the
optimal p vð Þ must assign probability one to bidder i with the highest
virtual value C(vi) if it exceeds δZ(v0), and otherwise probability one
to the seller,
p vð Þ∈ arg max
p′∈Δn + 1








Z v0ð Þ = ∫
V−0





f−0 v−0ð Þdv−0: ð17Þ
Consequently, Z0(v0) is a solution of the above equation on Xv ;v
 
and, moreover, it is independent of v0. We now show that there
exists a unique solution. First, note that the right-hand side of (17)
is a continuous function of Z(v0) and it is always between v and v
for any Z v0ð Þ∈ Xv ;v
 
. Hence, by the Brouwer fixed point theorem, a
431A. Matros, A. Zapechelnyuk / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 29 (2011) 426–431solution exists. Next, subtracting δZ(v0) from both sides of (17) and
replacing Z(v0) by z yields








The left-hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing in z
and the right-hand side is weakly decreasing, thus there exists only
one solution.
We denote the solution of Eq. (17) by Z⁎. Substituting Z(v0) by Z⁎
in (16) and (17) yields, respectively, parts (ii) and (i) of Lemma 2.
It remains to prove part (iii). By Lemma 3 for every i=1,2,…,n, xi
must satisfy




Ppi zð Þf zð Þdz−Ui 0ð Þ
and the constraint Ui(0)≥0 is binding in the optimal mechanism,
hence Ui(0)=0. Finally, by (7) the seller's expected revenue from
auctioning the object is equal to U0⁎ if and only if
Px0 v0ð Þ = U⁎0
1−δPp0 v0ð Þð Þ.
Proof of Theorem 1
We know from Section 4 that a feasible mechanism p;xð Þ is
optimal if it is the Myerson's (1981) optimal auction with the seller's
continuation revenue equal to δZ⁎ and with x0 satisfying
Px0 v0ð Þ = U⁎0 1−δ
Pp0 v0ð Þð Þ, v0∈ Xv ;v
 
. Here, Z⁎ is given by Lemma 2,
part (i), and it is the highest joint revenue of the seller and the
mediator that can be attained among feasible mechanisms, condi-
tional on the object being auctioned; U0⁎ is the solution of the
maximization problem (13) and it is the value of the seller's expected
revenue (conditional on the object being auctioned) whichmaximizes
the mediator's (unconditional) expected revenue.
Let p;xð Þ be the closing-fee auctionwith the fee μ⁎=1−U0⁎/Z⁎. This
is a Vickrey auction with n bidders where the seller obtains a fraction 1
−μ⁎ of the total revenue and chooses a reserve price thatmaximizes his
own revenue. Hence it is the Myerson's (1981) optimal auction





  = δZ⁎: ð18Þ
We will show that, with the given choice of a closing fee, the
seller's expected revenue from auction is precisely U0⁎ and the reserve
price that maximizes the seller's revenue coincides with the reserve
price r⁎ that is optimal for the mediator.
First, since the total revenue from the auction is Z⁎ and the seller
obtains fraction 1−μ⁎ of the revenue, it follows that the seller's
expected revenue from the (repeated) auction, is equal to (1−μ⁎)
Z⁎=U0⁎.
Second, in the closing-fee auction for every reserve price r
denote by π(r) the probability that the object is sold and by ρ(r) the
expected closing price. In other words, ρ(r) is the expected payment
of the winning bidder conditional on the event that the object issold. Then the optimal expected revenue of the seller is given by the
following:
U⁎0 = maxr≥ Xv
1−μ⁎
 	
π rð Þρ rð Þ + 1−π rð Þð ÞδU⁎0
n o
:












The reserve price r=r(U0⁎) that maximizes the above expression
for any given U0⁎ (e.g., Krishna, 2002) satisfies as follows:
r−1−F rð Þ




As by assumption r−1−F rð Þ
f rð Þ ≡C rð Þ is strictly increasing, the optimal
reserve price is unique. Since μ⁎=1−U0⁎ /Z⁎, the right-hand side of





= δZ⁎. Hence, Eqs. (18) and (19) are identical,
and so are their solutions, r(U0⁎)=r⁎.
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